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BAR BRIEFS
sary that the members of the Bar of this state do some co-operative
marketing. In other words, that they sell to the people of the state,
and especially to. the members of the Legislature, ideas, and, if you
please, ideals.
For some years last past there has existed a movement sponsored
by the American Bar Association, and having the approval of the
President of the U. S., looking towards more uniformity of law as
between the several states. This movement has had a modicum of
success, as is witnessed by the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act,
Uniform Sales Law, Uniform Motor Vehicle Law and the like, but
the field has been just scratched, the work just started.
In connection with this movement, there have been appointed
commissioners from this state to the conference held annually just
prior to the meeting of the American Bar Association. These commissioners are compelled to attend this conference, if they do attend
it, at their own expense. The result is that frequently thecommissioners are not in attendance and therefore this state has no part in the
work done by the conference and is not in touch therewith. The committee on Uniform Laws in this state has endeavored and is now trying its level best to excite public interest in this matter. Without the
co-operation of the members of the Bar, the work of the committee
will be nullified. It is therefore most strenuously urged that the Bar
of the state and each member give to the committee this co-operation.
There are certain particular things that are necessary to the advancement of this work: 1st, Each member of the Bar should know
the subject and should be prepared to transmit this knowledge to
others; 2nd, The members of the Bar should make it their duty to
disseminate this knowledge among the laymen and particularly to
give full instruction with respect to the movement to local members
of the Legislature, not as lobbyists, but as teachers.
Certainly there are few members of the Legislature that would not
be glad to learn all that there is to know about this subject if approached in the spirit of cooperation and public benefaction. And
last, but not least, it is a prime necessity thatthere should be an appropriation for at least the expense incurred by the commissioners in
going to, attending, and returning from the annual conference. It is
the duty of the members of the Bar to make the local members of the
Legislature understand this necessity. Certainly if the Legislature
can be be made to see clearly that the work is necessary or expedient,
it will not expect the commissioners not only to give their time but
in addition thereto to pay the expense of this public work out of their
own pockets. It is time for members of the Bar of this state to abandon the attitude of "Let George do it". It is time for the profession
to do some cooperative marketing.

REFORM PROPOSALS FOR LAW OF EVIDENCE
There has been considerable talk over a period of about ten years
concerning reforms in legal procedure. It is only in the last two or
three, however, that constructive proposals to effect reform have
really been presented to the Bar and to the public. This very fact
entitles such proposals as are made to serious consideration.
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Not only do reform proposals, come to us as the result of much
research and long deliberation, but, in the majority of instances, the
members of the committees that performed the work incident to such
research and deliberation have represented the best in judicial, pedagogical and practical viewpoints. These proposals are, therefore, entitled to respectful as well as serious consideration.
We certainly have no hesitancy in presenting to the consideration
of this Association the text of a uniform statute which, by makinig
fundamental changes without overthrowing the bulwark of law precedent, is expected to discount materially the disrepute into which law
and lawyers, courts and procedural processes are said to have fallen.
This text represents the systematic inquiry over a period of five or
six years by Prof. John H. Wigmore, authority on the law of evidence,
Judge Chas. M. Hough, of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Chief Justice
Win. A. Johnson, of Kansas, and six teachers of law from Chicago.
Columbia, Harvard, Michigan and Yale, whose cautious conclusions
constitute such a conservative formula as to suggest one's immediate
approval. The text:
i. "Any rule of evidence need not be enforced if the trial judge,
on inquiry made of counsel or otherwise, finds that there is no bona
fide dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence
of the fact which the offered evidence tends to prove, even though such
facts may be in issue under the pleadings. No error can be assigned
or predicated'upon the violation of any rule of evidence, either at law
or in equity, when it appears from statements of counsel or from other
evidence in the case or is shown in any other lawful way, that there
is no bona fide dispute between the parties as to the fact sought to
be proved or disproved by the offered evidence, even though such fact
may be in issue under the pleadings.
2. "The trial judge may express to the jury, after the close of
the evidence and arguments, his opinion as to the weight and credibility
of the evidence or any part thereof.
3. "No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action,
suit or proceeding by reason of his interest in the event of the same
as a party or otherwise. In actions, suits or proceeding by or against
the representatives of deceased persons, including proceedings for the
probate of wills, any statement of the deceased, whether oral or written,
shall not be excluded as hearsay, provided that the trial judge shall
find as a fact that the statement was made by decedent, and that it
was made in good faith and on decedent's personal knowledge.
4. "A declaration, whether written or oral, of a deceased or
insane person shall not be excluded from the evidence as hearsay, if
the court finds that it was made and that it was made in good faith
before the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.
5. "Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in
a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act,
transaction, occurrence or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof
of said act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge shall find
that it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event
or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the
making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowl-
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edge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect weight, but they
shall not affect its admissibility. The term business shall include
business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind."

U. S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
P., a resident of New Jersey, while driving a team hitched to a
wagon, was run into by W., a resident of Pennsylvania. The accident
occurred on a New Jersey highway, and P. was injured. Under a
statute providing that the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, not
licensed as provided by law, who accepted privilege of driving on New
Jersey highways, should, by such acceptance, constitute the Secretary
of State his agent for acceptance of service of process in civil suits
for damages arising from accident or collision, suit was brought in
New Jersey and judgment entered. W. appealed, contending that
service was invalid under the I 4 th amendment. HELD: A state has
the right to compel the registration of non-residents who use its roads,
and to provide that the use of such roads by those who do not register
shall be deemed consent to appointment of a designated state officer to
accept service of process, but the act must contain provisions making
it reasonably probable that the non-resident defendant will receive
notice of the substituted service. Every statute of this kind, thereiore,
should require the plaintiff bringing the suit to show in the summcns
to be served the post office address or residence of the defendant
being sued, and should impose either on the plaintiff himself or upon
the official receiving service, or some other person, the duty of communication by mail or otherwise with the defendant.--WiVuchter zs.
Pizzutti, Sup. Ct. Rep. 48-259.

Plaintiff association was incorporated under the Bingham Act
of Kentucky, which authorizes the incorporation of non-profit, cooperative associations for marketing agricultural products, provides
that only producers may become members and that the corporation
may contract only with them for marketing such products, declares,
further, that these contracts shall not be illegal, fixes penalties for
interference, and provides that the association shall not be deemed a
conspiracy, illegal combination or monopoly. One K. joined the association, made the standard contract, but afterwards sold his product to
the defendant company, which disposed of the same despite the fact
that it had been notified of the contract and reminded of the penalties
in case of such disposition. HELD: The states may, in the protection of agriculture, sanction contracts of producers for the sale of
the entire crop to cooperative marketing agencies and penalize the
breach of the same. They may modify the common law in this respect
by declaring that such contracts shall not be deemed combinations in
restraint of trade. Case distinguished from Conolly vs. Union ,,.ewer
Pipe Co. upon ground that.the statute there expressly exempted from
its operation agricultural products and live stock in the hands of producers or raisers, and thereby denied the equal protection of law to
the Sewer Pipe Co.-Liberty Warehouse Co. vs. Burley Tobacco
Growers' Co-operative Marketing Association, Sup. Ct. Rep. 48-291.

